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Abstract
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) challenge the key hypothesis in
modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita
incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once
there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest
the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three-way rather
than dichotomous classiﬁcation of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski et. al. (2000)
we ﬁnd that the modernization hypothesis stands up well. We also ﬁnd that partial
democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime types.
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1 Introduction
The study of democratization is one of the most venerable literatures in comparative
politics. It is also one of the most vigorous, as controversies over theory and method interact
with empirical research in debates over the origins and determinants of democratic forms
of government. In recent years, however, an uncharacteristic lull seems to have descended
on this vibrant ﬁeld — a lull we attribute to the need to absorb the pivotal contribution of
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) (hereafter referenced PACL). Despite
the challenges posed by Boix (2002) and Boix and Stokes (2003), rather than igniting
debate, as would be right and proper, PACL appear instead to have quenched it.
Among the most notable of PACL’s ﬁndings is that modernization—speciﬁcally, an
increase in per capita GDP—is not a causal factor in the process of democratization.
Rather, they argue, the positive association between income and democracy results from
the reduced likelihood of more modern countries sliding back, as it were, into undemocratic
forms of government once having (randomly) become democratic. This ﬁnding is now
treated as received wisdom.
We challenge that ﬁnding. The grounds for our dissent are both methodological and
substantive. PACL employ a dichotomous classiﬁcation of political systems, in which
governments are either democratic or authoritarian, with rather stringent requirements for
being included in the former category. All countries failing to meet the necessary conditions
for being a full democracy are then deemed autocratic.
This approach, however, ignores the possibility of an intermediate category, “partial
democracies,” which possess some, but not all, of the properties that characterize full
democracies. Not only are such regimes becoming more numerous, there is also growing
evidence that they behave diﬀerently from either full democracies or full autocracies.
Mansﬁeld and Snyder (1995), for instance, show that partial democracies are more likely
to become involved in armed conﬂicts with other countries. Bacher (1998) argues that
countries in the similar Freedom House category of “partially free” regimes are most likely
to enact policies that harm the environment. Goldstone, et. al. (2000) demonstrate that
partial democracies are more prone to political instability, revolutions, and ethnic wars.
And Zakaria (2003), terming such regimes “illiberal democracies,” warns that they can be
just as oppressive and contemptuous of human rights as any dictatorship.
In this article, we ﬁrst review and critique the work of PACL. We indicate that they
mistakenly interpret their own estimates in a manner that predisposes them to reject the
modernization hypothesis. Shifting from their dichotomous to our trichotomous measure
of democracy, we recreate their result; employing Markov estimation, as do they, we then
demonstrate that our trichotomous measure is to be preferred.
What we learn from these eﬀorts is that higher per capita incomes increase the likelihood
of a movement away from autocracy as well as decrease the likelihood of a movement away
from democracy. That is, we ﬁnd reason (contra PACL) to support the modernization
hypothesis. In our view, democracy is a process, not an end state. And as is often the
case, the journey is more important than the destination.
We also learn that the frontier of this line of inquiry has shifted away from the study
of autocracies and democracies and toward the study of partial democracies. As we show
here, the behavior of these systems largely determines the level, rate, and properties of
1democratization. While thus inﬂuential, partial democracies, being highly heterogeneous,
are poorly understood. The study of democratization, we therefore conclude, should place
them at its focus.
The following section reviews the relevant literature on modernization theory. After
reviewing the results of previous research, we summarize the data used in our analysis and
our statistical techniques: tobit, Markov, and duration models. We then present our own
ﬁndings. The last section concludes by emphasizing the signiﬁcance of partial democracies.
2 Modernization Theory
Modernization theory was ﬁrst developed by Daniel Lerner (1958), a behavioral scientist
studying the role of the media in development (see also Deutsch 1961). Lerner designated as
modern those societies whose people are literate, urban-dwelling, and better oﬀ, in the sense
of commanding higher incomes. The later works of economists, such as Rostow (1960),
Kuznets (1966) and Chenery and Taylor (1968), focused on economic modernization. In so
doing, they emphasized the importance of structural change and associated the rise of per
capita incomes with the decline of the agrarian economy and the rise of urban industry.
The classic statement of the relationship between modernization and politics originates
from Lipset (1959), who ﬁrst established the link between the level of per capita income
and democracy in a global cross-section of nations. Lipset hypothesized that as societies
develop economically, their citizens no longer tolerate repressive political regimes. The rise
in per capita GDP, he argued, triggers a transition to democracy.
Pioneering the small-N research tradition in comparative historical sociology, Barring-
ton Moore (1966) related democratization to the rise of the middle class and to the terms
of its political incorporation, a result upheld by Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens
(1992). More common is the use of large-N data sets, with important contributions
from Cutright (1963), Dahl (1971), and Burkart and Lewis-Beck (1994), among others.
Londregan and Poole (1996) perform an especially careful test of the relation between
income and democracy and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, albeit modest, eﬀect.
Against this background, Przeworski and his co-authors advanced an important new
argument.1 Reminding us that correlation does not necessarily imply causation, PACL note
that countries may become democratic due to reasons unrelated to their level of economic
development. Once prosperous, however, if democracies with higher levels of GDP per
capita were to avoid slipping back into autocracy, then over time the relationship between
GDP and democracy would emerge. It would do so even though economic growth does not
cause democratization.
We agree with PACL that a true test of modernization theory should examine both
the impact of GDP on democratization and its ability to promote the consolidation of
established democracies. However, we take issue with their conclusion that economic
development does not play a signiﬁcant role in transitions away from autocracy. We dissent
because we ﬁnd their own work ﬂawed and because a more reﬁned measure of regime type
generates evidence of the impact of GDP that their measure obscures.
1See Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (1996), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), and especially
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000).
2As mentioned, Boix and Stokes (2003) also challenge the PACL ﬁndings. Their criticism
is somewhat muted, however, as they essentially agree with PACL that the impact of GDP
on democratization in the postwar period is negligible, even though it may be statistically
signiﬁcant. They argue that it is the prewar period—from the late 19th century through
the 1940’s—in which the impact of GDP on democracy is most powerful. Although we
agree with Boix and Stokes that the patterns of GDP and democratization are clear in the
prewar period, we argue that the same patterns are important in the postwar era as well.
3 The Work of PACL
As we have observed, PACL (2000) employ a dichotomous regime classiﬁcation. If (i) the
chief executive is elected; (ii) the legislature is elected; (iii) there is more than one political
party; and (iv) an incumbent regime has lost power, then the country is deemed democratic;
otherwise, it is classiﬁed authoritarian. Using this deﬁnition, PACL claim that increases
in per capita GDP do not inﬂuence transitions from autocracy to democracy; rather, they
help countries that are already democratic remain so. They base their conclusions on
Tables 2.12 and 2.17 from Chapter 2 of their book. The former, reproduced as the ﬁrst two
columns of Table 1, performs a Markov probit regression of regime type on lagged values
of per capita GDP, its square, and year-to-year GDP growth:
P(Dit)= Φ{β0 + β1GDP + β2GDP2 + β3Growth +
β4ID + β5IDGDP + β6IDGDP2 + β7IDGrowth}, (1)
where P(Dit) signiﬁes the probability that country i is a dictatorship in year t, Φ(·) is
the cumulative normal distribution, and ID is an indicator variable for dictatorship in
the previous period.2 As indicated in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1, PACL report
the coeﬃcients on GDP and GDP2 in this regression as insigniﬁcant when predicting
transitions both to and from democracy. PACL take this as evidence that the level of GDP
per capita does not inﬂuence democratic transitions.
Note that when ID = 1 in Equation 1, the coeﬃcient on GDP will be β1 + β5, the
coeﬃcient on GDP2 will be β2 + β6, and likewise for the constant (β0 + β4) and Growth
(β3 + β7). PACL’s Table 2.12 correctly reports these summed coeﬃcients in the columns
labeled “Transitions to democracy” (the second column of our Table 1), but the reported
P-values are those for β4 through β7 alone, rather than for the summed coeﬃcients.
To calculate the P-values for transitions to democracy, one must perform a Wald test
on the hypothesis that the sum of the appropriate coeﬃcients is 0.3 For example, the
coeﬃcient on β1 in Equation 1 is -0.201, with a P-value of 0.162, and the coeﬃcient on β5
is -0.128 with a P-value of 0.484. The sum of the coeﬃcients is -0.329, and PACL then
2Relative to PACL’s Table 2.12, the coeﬃcients on GDP and GDP
2 in Table 1 are multiplied by 1000.
3A Wald test is used to determine whether a linear combination of coeﬃcient values is equal to some
constant. Here we wish to test the restriction that, for instance, β1 + β5 = 0. See Greene (2003), pp.
484–88. All Wald tests were performed using the post-estimation test command in Stata 9.0. Note that
these same P-values can also be calculated by running two probits, one when the regime at time t − 1 is
democratic and another when it is a dictatorship.
3Table 1: Results from PACL Table 2.12
Indep. Var. Democ. → Autoc. Autoc. → Democ.
(Original)
Autoc. → Democ.
(Corrected)
Constant -1.144**
(0.000)
-2.524**
(0.000)
-2.524**
(0.000)
GDP -0.201
(0.162)
0.329
(0.484)
0.329**
(0.004)
GDP2 -0.003
(0.874)
-0.029
(0.191)
-0.029
(0.069)
GDP Growth -0.042**
(0.003)
-0.021**
(0.000)
-0.021*
(0.015)
N 1584 2407 2407
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.05 0.05
Note: P-values in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level; ** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
correctly reverse the sign to indicate the impact of GDP on transitions from dictatorship
to democracy.4
What these results tell us is that the impact of GDP on transitions to dictatorships is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, and that the impact of GDP on transitions to democracy
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from its impact on transitions to dictatorship; that is, -0.329 is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from -0.201. But in this context we are interested in whether the
sum of these coeﬃcients is diﬀerent from 0: that is, whether GDP is a signiﬁcant predictor
of transitions to democracy. And a Wald test of the hypothesis that β1 + β5 = 0 shows
that it can be rejected with a P-value of 0.004.
Substituting the corrected P-values into the analysis yields the results reported in the
last column of Table 1. As shown, these results actually run counter to PACL’s central
hypothesis: GDP inﬂuences transitions to democracy but not transitions to autocracy.
Both the GDP and GDP2 terms, however, contribute to the total impact of GDP on
transitions. To evaluate this impact, we employ the delta method, which involves evaluating
the derivative ∂P/∂GDP. For Equation 1, the derivative is:
Φ0  
β0 + β1GDP + β2GDP2 + β3Growth

· (β1 + 2β2GDP) (2)
when ID = 0, and
Φ0 
(β0 + β4) + (β1 + β5)GDP + (β2 + β6)GDP2 + (β3 + β7)Growth

·[(β1 + β5) + 2(β2 + β6)GDP] (3)
4The -0.329 coeﬃcient indicates the impact of GDP on transitions from dictatorship to dictatorship,
which is equal and opposite to its impact on transitions to democracy.
4when ID = 1. Performing these calculations, we ﬁnd that the overall coeﬃcient on GDP
for transitions to autocracy is -0.0034 with a standard error of 0.0015, and for transitions
to democracy the coeﬃcient is -0.011 with a standard error of 0.0034. The total impact of
GDP on regime change is thus signiﬁcant in both directions, rather than insigniﬁcant both
ways as reported by PACL.
PACL’s Table 2.17, reproduced as the ﬁrst two columns of Table 2, reports the results
from another Markov regression, this time without GDP2 but with a host of other
covariates. The authors acknowledge that the coeﬃcient on GDP is now signiﬁcant in
both directions, but discount this result, saying that “it is orders of magnitude larger for
democracies.” (p. 123) They do not indicate the basis for this statement.5
As with Table 2.12, however, PACL fail to report the signiﬁcance level of the sum of the
relevant coeﬃcients. The corrected version of these results is shown in the third column of
Table 2. This time the revised results are more favorable to their central hypothesis: GDP
is a signiﬁcant predictor of transitions to autocracy but not to democracy. These results,
however, are far from dispositive, as they are highly sensitive to model speciﬁcation.6
PACL’s results thus leave open the central issue: the signiﬁcance of GDP in transitions to
democracy.
4 A Trichotomous Measure of Democratization
Among the most hotly debated issues in the study of democratization is that of the
choice of measures (see, for example, Bollen and Jackman 1989; Collier and Adcock 1999;
Munck and Verkuilen 2002). We begin this section by deﬁning and summarizing our
three-fold categorization. We then describe our measure of a country’s previous history of
democratization and the other independent variables of our analysis.
Identifying Partial Democracies
PACL employ a dichotomous measure of democracy. Consider, however, the 85 au-
thoritarian regimes that Geddes (1999, pp. 115-16) records as having collapsed during
the “third wave.” Of these, 34 re-emerged as authoritarian regimes, and 30 as stable
democracies; 21 others, however, remained contested and unstable, she notes, and of these,
four descended into “warlordism.” Geddes’ discussion thus reminds us of the signiﬁcance
of partial democracies, a category that dichotomous measures fail to — indeed, cannot —
capture.7
Using the Polity IV scaling of regimes from -10 to +10, we categorize regimes as
Autocracies (Polity value -10 to 0), Partial Democracies (+1 to +7), or (Full) Democracies
5Indeed, this is one of the criticisms leveled at PACL by Boix and Stokes (2003). We discuss their results
at further length below.
6For example, in most speciﬁcations the inclusion of the Previous Transitions variable (labeled “STRA”
in PACL) makes the coeﬃcient on GDP insigniﬁcant. But an examination of the data patterns indicates
that the greater the number of previous transitions, the less of an eﬀect GDP has on the outcome. This in
turn suggests including an interactive term, and indeed when this term is added all three variables (GDP,
STRA, and GDP*STRA) are signiﬁcant.
7This division is also emphasized in Collier and Levitsky (1997).
5Table 2: Results from PACL Table 2.17
Indep. Var. Democ. → Autoc. Autoc. → Democ.
(Original)
Autoc. → Democ.
(Corrected)
Constant 0.114
(0.899)
3.414**
(0.002)
3.414**
(0.000)
GDP -0.547**
(0.000)
-0.033**
(0.000)
-0.033
(0.445)
GDP Growth -0.022
(0.181)
0.018*
(0.027)
0.018
(0.079)
Leadership
Turnover
0.975**
(0.001)
-0.527**
(0.000)
-0.527**
(0.007)
Religious
Fractionalization
0.026**
(0.010)
-0.001*
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.816)
% Catholic 3.937*
(0.048)
-0.369
(0.105)
-0.369
(0.707)
% Protestant 2.626*
(0.039)
0.038
(0.118)
0.038
(0.965)
% Moslem 5.087*
(0.016)
-0.147
(0.932)
-0.147
(0.890)
New
Country
-0.012
(0.978)
0.432
(0.365)
0.432*
(0.039)
British
Colony
-0.842*
(0.048)
-0.164
(0.153)
-0.164
(0.423)
Previous
Transitions
0.897**
(0.000)
-0.362**
(0.000)
-0.362**
(0.000)
% World
Democracies
-3.735*
(0.047)
-3.040
(0.750)
-3.040*
(0.011)
N 1584 2407 2407
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.05 0.05
Note: P-values in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level; ** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
6(+8 to +10).8 The Polity score is based on three components: measures of executive
constraints, political competition, and the quality of political participation. In autocracies,
the executive retains a high level of political discretion, often due to the absence of a strong
judiciary or powerful legislature. There is no organized competition for political oﬃce. And
political participation is orchestrated by those who hold power. In full democracies, the
executive faces binding constraints on the use of power; there are institutionalized forms
of political competition; and citizens openly propound and associations openly champion
civic causes.
Between these end points, there remain gradations: in partial democracies, the chief
executive may be elected, but then face weak constraints; and his selection may not
result from open and organized competition, but rather from lobbying by a politicized
military or from selection by a committee of a ruling party. Alternatively, the election
itself could be uncompetitive, either because of political manipulation by the authorities or
because political parties were highly factionalized. As of 2002 (Polity scores in parentheses),
Ethiopia (1), Nigeria (4), Venezuela (6), and Russia (7) illustrate what is meant by “partial
democracy.”
While the selection of the cut points must ultimately be arbitrary, we provide three
justiﬁcations. When the Polity score registers 7 or below, then the country fails to attain a
maximum score on any of its three component measures. Countries with 8 or higher reach
a maximum value on at least one of them; 9 or higher, on at least two; and 10 on all three.
Secondly, the Polity scores yield classiﬁcations that correspond well with those employed
by others. Most importantly, as noted in the discussion below, we can readily recover the
classiﬁcation employed by PACL using the Polity scores. Lastly, our argument is robust
to changes in the cut points: we estimated the regressions reported later in the paper with
the cutpoints between adjacent categories moved one or two units in either direction, and
the results did not change. In this sense, our ﬁndings are not the result of an arbitrary
choice of measure.
Thus deﬁned, partial democracies comprise 14.3% of country-years in our sample, which
includes 169 countries from 1960 to 2000. As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of partial
democracies among the world’s societies has grown markedly in recent years: it had a
minimum value of 3.6% in 1976 and rose to its maximum of 26.1% in 2000, with a notable
increase after the fall of the Soviet Union. The “third wave” peopled the globe with partial
democracies.
Whereas Figure 1 shows the overall patterns of democratization, Table 3 examines
the dynamics of change from one regime category to another. It shows the distribution
of autocracies, partial democracies, and democracies, conditioning on the previous year’s
category. The table reveals that both autocracies and full democracies are stable in the
short run: an average of 97.3% of all autocracies remain autocratic the next year, while
an average of 98.2% of all democracies remain democratic; thus around 2% of countries in
these categories change in a given year. Partial democracies are over four times less stable,
8Note that by our deﬁnition, partial democracies are truly an intermediate category, even relative to
PACL’s regime classiﬁcation formula. In the country-years for which our data sets overlap, 97% of regimes
that we code as autocratic PACL also code as autocracies, and 92% of our full democracies are democracies
in their data too. But of our partial democracies, 52% are democracies and 48% are autocracies by PACL’s
measure.
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Figure 1: World Democratization Trends, 1960-2000
however, with 9.6% of them changing into an autocracy or full democracy the following
year.
Table 3: Regime Category Transitions— One Year Lag
Current Year
Previous Year Autocracy Partial Democracy Democracy
Autocracy 97.3% 2.1% 0.7%
(3,121) (66) (22)
Partial Democracy 6.4% 90.4% 3.3%
(49) (695) (25)
Democracy 1.1% 0.8% 98.2%
(16) (12) (1,496)
Total 3,186 773 1,543
Note: Numbers in parentheses are cell counts.
These diﬀerences become even more pronounced when we expand the time horizon to
ﬁve years. About 11% of all autocracies change into partial or full democracies after ﬁve
years, and 7% of democracies change category ﬁve years later. The most volatile group,
again by a large margin, is partial democracy: almost 40% of these change category after
ﬁve years. Movements in or out of the category of partial democracy account for 80% of
the transitions in our sample.9
9Appendix 1 provides a complete categorization of countries by their number and type of transitions.
8These data highlight the importance of partial democracies: more volatile than either
pure democracies or autocracies, they account for an increasing portion of current regimes
and the lion’s share of regime transitions. Rather than dichotomizing countries into
democracies and autocracies, then, our dependent variable will be trichotomous, including
a middle category for partial democracy. This variable is called Regime Category in our
dataset, with Autocracies coded as 0, Partial Democracies as 1, and Full Democracies as 2.
In creating a three-category democracy measure, we heed the advice of both Elkins (2000),
who warns that dichotomous measures may obscure correlations that intermediate-graded
scales reveal, and Collier and Adcock (1999), who suggest that for studies of democratic
transitions, more coarse-grained measures are appropriate.
Previous Democratization
Many observers argue that a country’s previous transition history may aﬀect current eﬀorts
at democratization, as prior failures may spur or weaken future attempts. Goldstone and
Kocornik-Mina (2005) have shown that many countries experiencing democratic transitions
are “bouncers” or “cyclers” that move back and forth between autocracy and democracy
on multiple occasions. We somehow need to capture prior volatility and failed eﬀorts at
achieving democracy.
Despite its importance, however, a country’s history of negative experience with
democratization is hard to measure. Simply counting movements between categories will
miss unstable behavior that consists of substantial movements toward (or away from)
democracy within a single category: say from a Polity score of -10 to 0 and then back
to -10. Counting the value of all changes in Polity scores, on the other hand, will treat
successful and large transitions to democracy as indicating just as much volatility as a
country that experiences several smaller movements toward democracy that failed and fell
back.
We therefore settled on a variable “Previous Transitions,” which for country i in year t is
the cumulative sum of the absolute values of negative changes in the Polity score for country
i from 1960 up to and including year t. To illustrate the construction of this variable,
Figure 2 provides the values of both the Polity score and the Previous Transitions variable
for Turkey for each sample year. As the ﬁgure shows, the Polity score for Turkey varied
widely over this period, from 4 up to 9, down to -2, back up to 9, back down to -5, up to 9,
and then ﬁnally down to 7. Most measures would show that Turkey fell out of democracy
twice during the sample period, and, indeed, our measure rises at just those points where
the Polity score falls. At any given time then, the variable provides an indicator of the
country’s prior and cumulative negative experiences with democratization.10
Other Independent Variables
As independent variables, we employ the standard set of modernization indicators: log of
GDP per capita, year-to-year GDP growth, the percent of the population living in cities,
10We note also that our Previous Transitions measure correlates with PACL’s similar “STRA” variable
(for sum of transitions to authoritarianism) at 90.5% for all overlapping country-years.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Previous Transitions variable for Turkey, 1960–2000
and log of population density.11 Our focus will, of course, be on per capita GDP.
As controls, we use our Previous Transitions measure of prior experiences with
democratization (as in Acemoglu and Robinson 2001); log of trade openness, deﬁned as
exports plus imports over GDP (as in Rodrik 1997); and a variable indicating whether
over 75% of national income is derived from sales of minerals or petroleum. This latter
variable captures the “resource curse” hypothesis (as in Ross 1999 and Boix and Stokes
2003), which argues that countries deriving a large share of national income from easily
extractable natural resources tend to be undemocratic and unstable. Table 4 provides
descriptive statistics for all variables.12
5 Statistical Methodology
We address two distinct questions: what makes countries democratic, and what factors
help insure new democracies against backsliding to autocracy? The ﬁrst refers to
democratization; the second, to consolidation. We use two techniques to address the
11One might also add percent of GDP originating from agriculture to this list, but its correlation with
urbanization is over 90%. Thus we use only urbanization in our analysis.
12Data Sources: Polity Score—Polity V, IRIS, University of Maryland; GDP—Penn World Tables;
Urban Population—Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs of the United
Nations; Population Density—Hybrid of UN Population Division, World Development Indicators, and
Banks population density series (WDI is used if UND is not available; BNK is used if WDI is not
available); Trade Openness—Hybrid data series of World Development Indicators and Penn World Tables
trade openness (WDI is the primary source; PWT is used if WDI is missing); Resource Curse—United
Nations: Trade and Development Statistics.
10Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Polity Score -0.45 7.58 -10 10 5671
Regime Category 0.70 0.88 0 2 5671
Log of Per Capita GDP 8.14 1.04 5.64 10.21 4417
Percent Change in GDP 0.02 0.06 -0.52 1.01 4475
Percent Urban Pop. 44.94 24.29 2.3 100 5245
Log of Population Density 3.61 1.46 -0.49 8.77 5600
Log of Trade Openness 3.98 0.62 0.43 6.16 4902
Previous Transitions 3.96 6.41 0 31 5671
Resource Curse 0.23 0.42 0 1 5671
former—tobit and Markov analyses—and one to address the latter—duration analysis.
First, we shall examine democratization using a method that takes into account the
censoring of our data; that is, our scale is limited to the -10 to +10 range, perhaps
artiﬁcially. We employ a double-censored tobit model for these estimations, which uses
the full range of Polity values rather than categories or ranges of values.
Like PACL, we also use Markov transition models. However, as described above, instead
of their two-state model (democracy and dictatorship), we shall use a three-state model.
This allows us to estimate six distinct transitions: Autocracy to Partial Democracy, Partial
Democracy to Democracy, and Autocracy to Democracy, as well as the reverse of each. The
Markov model treats each of these six transitions as distinct and identiﬁes causal factors
associated with each kind of change.
Developed in biometrics, duration models estimate the impact of factors aﬀecting
survival. In our setting we wish to determine the factors that aﬀect the survival of newly-
ﬂedged democracies. Our analysis diﬀers from the classic medical setting, though, in that
each “patient” (or country, for us) can experience more than one episode of failure; it can
fall out of democracy more than once (witness Turkey). Hence we employ a repeated-
failures variant of the standard duration model.13 We wish to capture unit-speciﬁc eﬀects:
i.e., whether some countries are more “frail” (to return to a medical setting), in the sense
of being (to return once again to our application) more prone to autocracy.
Continuous Models with Data Censoring
Tobit models account for the possibility that the data are censored at either or both ends
of their range of values. That is, we assume, for country i at time t:
Y ∗
it = Xitβ + it,it ∼ N(0,σ2), (4)
Yit = Y ∗
it if a ≤ Y ∗
it ≤ b;Yit = a if Y ∗
it < a;Yit = b if Y ∗
it > b, (5)
where Y ∗
it is the implicit, or underlying value of the dependent variable, Yit is its observed
value, and a and b are the upper and lower bounds of the observation interval, respectively.
13 These models are becoming increasingly popular in political science, and our treatment of them owes
much to recent work by Box-Steﬀensmeier and Zorn (2002).
11(For the Polity scale used in this study, a = −10 and b = +10.) This gives rise to the
likelihood function:
Y
a≤Y ∗
it≤b

1
σ
φ

1
σ
(Yit − Xitβ)
 Y
Y ∗
it<a

Φ

1
σ
(a − Xitβ)
 Y
Y ∗
it>b

Φ

−
1
σ
(b − Xitβ)

.
The ﬁrst term corresponds to non-limit observations, the second to observations at the
lower limit a, and the third to observations at the upper limit b.14
The tobit methodology gives accurate estimates for processes in which data are limited
to some predetermined range. It also allows for the estimation of the percent of censored
observations, in order to determine the degree to which the upper and lower limits constrain
the estimation.
This part of the estimation, then, takes advantage of the full 21 point Polity scale.
However, the technique assumes that moves up the Polity scale are caused by factors equal
and opposite to those driving moves down the scale. As PACL have shown, it is often the
case that a given factor may have a diﬀerent impact on transitions toward, or away from,
greater democracy. We therefore supplement the tobit analysis with a Markov switching
model.
Markov Transition Models
The Markov model employs a smaller number of possible democratization categories and
then estimates the probability of moving from any given state to another state in a single
period. In these models, history matters: the conditions present in one period can aﬀect
the probabilities of diﬀerent types of transitions in the subsequent period.15 Markov models
thus estimate equations of the form:
F[Pr(Yit = b|Yit−1 = a)] = θab + Xitβa, (6)
where a and b are possible regime types and F(·) is a function from the [0,1] interval to
the real line, such as the logit

F(z) = log z
1−z

or probit
 
F(z) = Φ−1(z)

functions.
To expedite the analysis, we follow Clayton (1992) and work with cumulative transition
probabilities. Assume that there are C ordered categories of the dependent variable (C = 3
for our study), labeled 0,1,...,C −1. It then becomes convenient to express the equations
in terms of Y ∗ variables, where Y ∗
a = 1 if Y ≤ a. In our data, for example, if we let Yit = 0
indicate that country i is an autocracy at time t, Yit = 1 indicate partial democracy, and
Yit = 2 indicate full democracy, then the translation from Y to Y ∗ is given in Table 5.
As by deﬁnition, Pr(Y ≤ a) = Pr(Y ≤ a − 1) + Pr(Y = a), we can recover the
individual transition probabilities from the set of cumulative probabilities. We therefore
estimate equations of the form:
F[Pr(Yit = b|Yit−1 ≤ a)] = θab + Xitβa, (7)
14See Greene (2003), pp. 764-66 for a good textbook discussion of these models.
15Variables associated with other historical aspects of a country’s development, such as previous
transitions to democracy, can be added to the model as independent variables. See the discussion of
our Previous Transitions variable above.
12Table 5: Deﬁnition of Y ∗ Variables
Y : 0 1 2
Y ∗
0 : 1 0 0
Y ∗
1 : 1 1 0
for b = 0,1,2 and a = 0,1, which is equivalent to Equation 6, substituting values of Y ∗
for values of Y in the previous period. One could estimate Equation 7 separately for each
regime type, or, as with dichotomous Markov regressions, combine the data for each value
of b into a single equation, including interactions of the independent variables and lagged
values of Y ∗:
F

Pr(Yit = b|Y ∗
it−1 = y∗
it−1)

= θb +
1 X
`=0
α`by∗
it−1` + xit
 
β +
1 X
`=0
γ`y∗
it−1`
!
, (8)
for b = 0,1,2. Under this formulation, θb = θC−1 and αab = θab − θ(a+1)b, so a signiﬁcant
value for the α terms indicates that adjacent categories should not be combined together.
Similarly, β = βC−1 and γa = βa − βa+1, so insigniﬁcant γ values indicate that an
independent variable has similar eﬀects on transition probabilities for adjacent categories
of the lagged dependent variable.
A distinctive advantage of this approach, then, is that we can test whether adjacent
categories of our dependent variable should be collapsed. As we shall see, this feature
enables us to test the validity of our own three-way classiﬁcation; to compare it to PACL’s
two-way categorization; and to explore the signiﬁcance of that comparison. Given our
three-way division of regime types, for example, a Markov model of regime type on GDP
indicates that none of the adjacent categories should be combined. But if we add a
fourth type—“partial autocracies” with Polity scores between -6 and 0—the same test
indicates that the full and partial autocracies should indeed be combined into a single
regime category.
Equation 8 can be run separately for each value of b or with an ordered probit, where
the dependent variable is the ordered regime category. We begin with a “fully saturated”
model, with right-hand side variables consisting of the lagged regressors (GDP, growth,
urbanization, etc.), the lagged values of the indicator variables Y ∗
0 , lagged Y ∗
1 , and all
interactions between the regressors and indicators. From this initial model, with its
profusion of interactive terms, one tests down, eliminating insigniﬁcant interactions to
arrive at a more parsimonious speciﬁcation.16 It is the result of this procedure that we
report.
Survival Analysis
To investigate the determinants of consolidation, we employ duration models. As
mentioned above, our application diﬀers from that in biometrics in two important ways:
16This procedure is elaborated in Chapter 10 of Diggle, Liang, and Zeger (2002).
13we think that countries might have unit-speciﬁc heterogeneity, and we know that they may
experience repeated failure.
In duration models, unit-speciﬁc eﬀects are captured by “frailty” terms, written as
hi(t) = λi(t)νi,
where hi(t) is the hazard rate for observation i at time t and νi is an individual-speciﬁc
factor which operates multiplicatively on the hazard. In biometrics, this term captures
the patient-speciﬁc susceptibility to a disease; in our setting, it refers to a country’s
susceptibility to autocracy. If countries diﬀer in their frailties, but these terms are left
out of the estimating equation, then there will be more variability in the actual hazard
than is captured by the model (Omori and Johnson 1993). Over time, diﬀerences in frailty
will cause observations to “select out” of the data; that is, low-frailty cases will stay in,
while high-frailty ones will drop out. The model will then underestimate the hazard, with a
corresponding overestimate of survival times. Not only is the shape of the hazard function
incorrectly estimated; if the νi terms are correlated with the independent variables, then
the estimated coeﬃcients will also be biased.
Analogously with panel data, these unit-speciﬁc eﬀects can be estimated via ﬁxed or
random eﬀects. Following Lancaster (1990), we adopt the random-eﬀects approach, which
involves choosing a speciﬁc distribution for the νi’s; the most commonly-used is the gamma
(1,θ) distribution.17
For the estimation, we ﬁrst ﬁt a standard proportional hazards model, and then choose
a set of possible values for θ. For each of these values, we generate an estimated “predicted
frailty” for each observation. We then ﬁt a second duration model, this time including the
estimated νi terms as an additional covariate, with a ﬁxed coeﬃcient of 1.0 (that is, as an
oﬀset):
h(t) = h0(t)ˆ νi exp(Xiβ).
We then repeat these steps for each value of θ until convergence.
A second distinctive characteristic of our data is that we can have repeated failures—
countries can fall out of democracy more than once—and we would not wish to impose a
priori the requirement that these failures be independent of one another. In particular,
methods that ignore correlations among repeated failures will tend to underestimate the
standard errors.
To address this property, we require that our frailty terms not be independent, but
rather correlated across all observations from a single country. The unit of observation
thus becomes a “country-spell;” that is, a sequential run of years in which a given country
remains in a single regime. We then restrict the estimated frailty terms to be constant (in
parlance, “shared”) for all observations from a given country. The approach, once again,
is to test down: i.e., to start with a proportional hazards model with shared frailties, and
if these are not signiﬁcant, then to remove this requirement and estimate a less restricted
model instead.
17See also Vaupel et. al. (1979) and Manton et. al. (1981).
146 Regression Results
To assess the validity of this claim, we proceed to analyze the results from the tobit,
Markov, and survival analyses described above. In each case, we estimate three models:
GDP alone; GDP plus the other modernization variables; and GDP, modernization, and
political control variables. The Tobit regressions also include a lagged dependent variable
and control for regional eﬀects: Africa, East Asia, Europe, Former Soviet Union, Latin
America, and Near East.18
Tobit Regressions
The tobit results are given in Table 6. As indicated, GDP is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations:
countries are more likely to be democratic the higher their level of economic development.
Moreover, the overall model ﬁt is good, with a pseudo-R2 of about 40%, high enough to
capture signiﬁcant amounts of variation, but not so high that one would suspect that the
lagged dependent variable was doing all the work.
Table 6: Tobit regression analysis of factors aﬀecting democratic transitions (regional ﬁxed
eﬀects omitted)
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Polity Score .964 .962 .962
(.006)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
GDP Per Capita .362 .385 .32
(.063)∗∗∗ (.099)∗∗∗ (.102)∗∗∗
GDP Growth -2.458 -2.72
(.782)∗∗∗ (.783)∗∗∗
Pct. Urban Pop. 0 -.003
(.004) (.004)
Population Density .059 .032
(.035)∗ (.036)
Trade Openness .292
(.077)∗∗∗
Previous Transitions .013
(.007)∗∗
Resource Curse -.067
(.113)
N 4259 3789 3789
Pseudo-R2 .396 .397 .398
Note: All independent variables lagged one year. *=.10; **=.05; ***=.01.
18The countries in each region are listed in Appendix 2.
15The regression results also highlight some interesting regularities. First, note that
higher GDP growth rates are associated with autocracies. On its own this ﬁnding might
be puzzling, but see the Markov analysis below, which indicates that this relation holds
only for countries starting in autocracy. Looking at the other two modernization variables,
urbanization is negatively related to democracy and population density is positively related,
but neither relation is statistically signiﬁcant.
As for the political variables, the results on PrevTrans, our measure of previous
attempts at democratization, indicate that countries that experience previous falls from
democracy tend to be more democratic (but, again, see the discussion of this variable in the
Markov regressions below). Trade openness is also associated with more democracy. And
the “resource curse” is negatively related to democracy, but the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant.
These ﬁndings corroborate previous results linking economic development to democracy,
but they are, of course, subject to PACL’s objection that modernization variables may
describe well those countries already in democracy but do not predict transitions out of
autocracy. This possibility is addressed in the Markov transition analysis below.
Markov Regressions
As a ﬁrst look at the data, consider Figure 3, which shows a local regression (lowess) plot of
logged GDP per capita and the probability of transitions in or out of full democracy. The
most obvious pattern is that GDP does seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on the probability
of transition both into and out of democracy, and with roughly similar magnitudes. This
initial view of the data induces skepticism regarding PACL’s claim that GDP impacts
transitions from but not into democracy.
PACL also make much of the fact that no democracy has ever fallen with a GDP per
capita greater than $6,055, the prevailing level of income in Argentina when it transitioned
to autocracy in 1975. They thus imply that the probability of transitioning to autocracy
falls sharply once a country passes this key income level. As shown in Figure 3, though, no
sharp dropoﬀ is evident; the probability of leaving democracy declines smoothly as GDP
increases, without any indication that one level of wealth is more critical than another.
PACL also claim that the income levels at which countries transition out of autocracy
show signiﬁcantly more variation than the levels at which countries transition out of
democracy. Figure 4 shows that the data do not support PACL’s claim: the distribution
of GDP values for transitions to democracy actually has a slightly smaller variance than
the distribution of income for transitions to autocracy (0.712 vs. 0.742).
We begin our Markov analysis with all possible interactions between the regressors and
lagged values of Y ∗
0 and Y ∗
1 , and then test down to a more parsimonious model. Recall that
if, for example, the interaction between GDP and Y ∗
0 (GDP ∗Y ∗
0 ) is signiﬁcant, this means
that GDP has a diﬀerent eﬀect on the level of democracy if the regime is autocratic in
the previous period, as opposed to partially or fully democratic. Similarly, if GDP ∗Y ∗
1 is
signiﬁcant, GDP has a diﬀerent impact when the regime is fully democratic in the previous
period, as opposed to the other two alternatives. Consequently, if both GDP ∗ Y ∗
0 and
GDP ∗ Y ∗
1 are signiﬁcant, GDP has a diﬀerent eﬀect for all three lagged regime types.
The results of this analysis are illustrated in Table 7 in raw form, showing the
signiﬁcance of the direct and interactive eﬀects, and in Table 8 in a more easily interpretable
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Figure 3: Impact of GDP on Transition Probabilities
format. Beginning with the former, we see that the signiﬁcance levels of the coeﬃcients on
the modernization variables are similar in all three models. In particular, GDP per capital
is highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
Table 8 distills the results from the analysis, showing only the relevant (sums of)
coeﬃcients from the direct and interactive eﬀects. Coeﬃcients that straddle table rows
have similar eﬀects for the adjacent categories. In all three models, for example, GDP
has a similar impact on democratization when the country in question was autocratic
or partially democratic in the previous period, as opposed to fully democratic. If the
country was autocratic or partially democratic, the coeﬃcient is 0.18 (the sum of GDP
and GDP ∗ Y ∗
1 in Table 7); if the country was fully democratic, then the coeﬃcient on
GDP in Model 1 is 0.80 (the direct eﬀect from Table 7). Both are signiﬁcant, as they
are in Models 2 and 3 as well, indicating that higher GDP does produce more democratic
regimes, no matter what the starting point, and no matter which sets of covariates are
added to the estimation equation.
The other ﬁndings in the table are also interesting, and help shed light on the results
from the Tobit analysis above. The coeﬃcient on growth, for example, is signiﬁcant only for
countries starting as autocracies, in which case it inhibits democratic transitions; otherwise,
growth is not a signiﬁcant factor. This result explains the negative coeﬃcient on growth
17Table 7: Markov regression analysis
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Y0 -2.686 -2.979 -2.866
(.073)∗∗∗ (.758)∗∗∗ (.105)∗∗∗
Lagged Y1 2.226 4.134 3.836
(.85)∗∗∗ (1.491)∗∗∗ (1.538)∗∗
GDP Per Capita .8 1.118 .997
(.096)∗∗∗ (.202)∗∗∗ (.218)∗∗∗
GDP per capita * Y1 -.622 -.971 -.803
(.105)∗∗∗ (.219)∗∗∗ (.231)∗∗∗
GDP Growth -.127 -.385
(.973) (.986)
GDP Growth * Y0 -2.232 -1.844
(1.302)∗ (1.305)
Pct. Urban Pop. -.016 -.012
(.007)∗∗ (.008)
Pct. Urban Pop. * Y1 .019 .013
(.008)∗∗ (.008)
Population Density .017
(.034)
Population Density * Y0 .075
(.049)
Trade Openness .228
(.129)∗
Trade Openness * Y1 -.236
(.142)∗
Previous Transitions -.023
(.013)∗
Previous Transitions * Y0 .033
(.009)∗∗∗
Previous Transitions * Y1 .026
(.015)∗
Resource Curse -.185
(.098)∗
N 4299 3789 3789
Pseudo-R2 .773 .776 .780
Note: All independent variables lagged one year. *=.10; **=.05; ***=.01.
18Table 8: Summary of Markov Results
Model
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Per Capita
A
0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.19∗∗
P
D 0.80∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
GDP Growth
A −2.34∗∗∗ −2.23∗∗
P
−0.189 −0.386
D
Percent Urban Pop.
A
0.002 −0.0001
P
D −0.015∗∗ −0.013∗
Population Density
A 0.095∗∗∗
P
0.021
D
Trade Openness
A
−0.010
P
D 0.227∗
Previous Transitions
A 0.035∗∗∗
P 0.002
D −0.024∗
Resource Curse
A
−0.186∗ P
D
Note: Coeﬃcients refer to the relevant sums of direct and interactive eﬀects. ∗ < 0.10;
∗∗ < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01. A = Autocracy; P = Partial Democracy; D = Full Democracy.
19Variance = 0.712
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in Table 6. Urbanization, on the other hand, appears to undermine democracies but has
no eﬀect on other regime categories. And population density, signiﬁcant in Model 2 only,
promotes transitions out of autocracy but has no impact on partially or fully democratic
regimes.
Turning to the political variables, trade openness helps stabilize full democracies, but
it does not help autocratic or partially democratic regimes move up the ladder. The
results for our PrevTrans variable illustrate the power of the Markov approach. Previous
transitions destabilize autocracies, have no impact on partial democracies, and make full
democracies more likely to backslide; in other words, they are a destabilizing force. Thus a
single variable can have diﬀerent impacts (in fact, opposite signs) depending on the starting
point in the previous period. Finally, the resource curse tends to make all regime categories
more autocratic.
Why do our results from the Markov analysis vary so markedly from PACL’s? They,
after all, test a similar model to ours. Perhaps the diﬀerence comes from our coding
of the dependent variable: we use Polity scores, while PACL employ their own measure
of autocracy and democracy. If we substitute our Polity measure into their regressions,
though, combining partial and full democracies into a single democratic category, the
estimation results from PACL’s model speciﬁcation still hold. In particular, even with a
Polity version of the dependent variable, lagged GDP is shown to be a signiﬁcant predictor
of transitions out of democracy, but not to democracy.
Conversely, we dropped the “partial” category in our data set. With this speciﬁcation,
20the coeﬃcient on GDP is, as PACL concluded, signiﬁcant for transitions to autocracy, but
not to democracy. In both data sets, then, one can reproduce PACL’s results using a
dichotomous regime classiﬁcation with Polity data, and thus rule out the possibility that
diﬀerences in the measure of democracy account for diﬀerences in our ﬁndings.
Continuing in this fashion, we subdivide the two PACL regime categories into four: 1)
PACL autocracies that we did not list as partial democracies; 2) PACL autocracies that
we list as partial democracies; 3) PACL democracies that we list as partial democracies;
and 4) PACL democracies that we did not list as partial democracies. PACL combine
categories 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4, while we combine 2 and 3 together, but leave 1 and 4
as distinct categories. If our categorization is correct, then we should see relatively more
transitions out of category 1 into categories 2, 3, or 4 than we would see from categories
1 and 2 to categories 3 or 4. And, in fact, 2.63% of regimes transition out of category 1,
which is a 49% increase over the 1.76% that transition out of categories 1 or 2.
Moreover, when we run a Markov regression with GDP as an independent variable, we
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients separating categories 2 and 3 are uniformly insigniﬁcant, while
those separating category 1 from category 2 and category 3 from category 4 are uniformly
signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding supports the use of our tripartite regime classiﬁcation rather than
PACL’s dichotomous speciﬁcation.
Finally, note the elusive nature of partial democracies. Although we can gain some
understanding of the factors that make autocracies (or full democracies) become partially
democratic, we have little information as to the factors that would lead partial democracies
to either slide down to autocracy or to move up to full democracy. In fact, examining
the saturated regression with all direct and interactive eﬀects, we ﬁnd that none of the
coeﬃcients on partial democracy are signiﬁcant on their own. Numerous, volatile, and
shaping the dynamics of regime transitions, the determinants of the behavior of the partial
democracies elude our understanding.
Duration Analysis
We now turn to the duration analysis, which highlights the factors that help countries stay
democratic. Given our trichotomous measure of democracy, there are two ways in which
we could approach this issue: what prevents full democracies from sliding back to partial
democracies or autocracies, and what prevents partial democracies from sliding back to
autocracy?
PACL also perform duration analysis, and they argue that new democracies are in fact
more likely to fail than more established ones, but that once GDP per capita is taken
into account, this diﬀerence disappears. We examine this conclusion using the same three
models as in the previous section.
Table 9 shows the results of estimating the probabilities that states fall out of full
democracy. The frailty terms were signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, and so they are retained
in the estimation equations.
Note ﬁrst that in all speciﬁcations, higher GDP per capita reduces the probability that
countries fall out of democracy. Other than this ﬁnding, however, the results oﬀer few
clues as to the factors that help prevent backsliding. Higher urban populations are a risk
factor for democracies in Model 2, and trade openness is a stabilizing factor in Model 3,
21Table 9: Survival analysis of transitions out of full democracy
Model
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Per Capita -1.853 -2.784 -2.895
(.328)∗∗∗ (.65)∗∗∗ (.777)∗∗∗
GDP Growth -6.8 -6.526
(7.136) (7.785)
Pct. Urban Pop. .041 .031
(.022)∗ (.026)
Population Density .023 .02
(.236) (.309)
Trade Openness -1.265
(.505)∗∗
Previous Transitions .067
(.04)∗
Resource Curse .448
(.855)
N 1483 1356 1356
Log Likelihood -78.326 -63.167 -58.778
θ .383 .67 .895
Note: All independent variables lagged one year. *=.10; **=.05; ***=.01.
but no other coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
Figure 5 graphs the impact of GDP on transitions, plotting the smoothed hazard rates
both with and without adjustment for GDP per capita.19 The top ﬁgure shows that the
risk of falling out of democracy rises at ﬁrst, then declines after the ﬁrst seven years as a full
democracy. The bottom ﬁgure tells a very diﬀerent story. Here, after adjusting for GDP
per capita, the risk of failure rises steadily for about twenty years, and then plateaus. To
put it another way, it is the average increase in per capita GDP that causes the reduction
in the hazard rate in the top ﬁgure. The key to consolidation of new democracies, it would
appear, is a strong economy.
We now repeat the above analysis for partial democracies, to see if similar factors keep
semi-democratic societies from falling back into autocracy.20 Here, the frailty terms were
never signiﬁcant and were dropped from the estimation.
Table 10 presents the results. Compared with transitions from full democracy, the
predictive ability of these models is much smaller. The coeﬃcient on GDP per capita is
19The adjustment sets GDP per capita at its mean value and calculates hazard rates for all other variables.
The fact that the curve ﬂattens out is evidence that variation in GDP accounts for the U-shaped function
in the top ﬁgure.
20Since we are interested in the question of stabilizing partial democracies, transitions to full democracy
are treated as censored observations in this part of the analysis.
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Figure 5: Adjusted and Unadjusted Hazard Rates for Falling Out of Democracy
again negative in all speciﬁcations, but marginally signiﬁcant in Model 2 and insigniﬁcant
in Model 3. The only other signiﬁcant variables are trade openness and the resource curse
in Model 3, the former associated with less risk of falling into autocracy, the latter with
increased risk.21 And the log likelihoods of all models are smaller than those in Table 9.
Neither does Figure 6 oﬀer much evidence as to the factors that aﬀect the consolidation
of partial democracies. The unadjusted hazard rate in the top half of the ﬁgure rises gently,
turning negative only after 13 years (at which point there are relatively few data points
remaining in the sample). This general pattern does not change, even after adjusting not
just for GDP, but for all independent variables in Model 3. As in the Markov analysis,
then, the factors aﬀecting transitions out of partial democracy remain poorly understood.
7 Conclusion
This paper has returned to the analysis of the relationship between modernization and
democracy. In doing so, it has reappraised the central argument of the works of PACL,
21One might also reasonably inquire whether countries becoming partial democracies after falling out
of full democracy show diﬀerent patterns in their hazard rates. To evaluate this possibility, a variable
FullToPart was added to the analysis, but it was never signiﬁcant.
23Table 10: Survival analysis of transitions from partial democracy to autocracy
Model
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Per Capita -.695 -.692 -.603
(.221)∗∗∗ (.356)∗ (.395)
GDP Growth 3.939 4.295
(3.651) (3.799)
Pct. Urban Pop. -.002 -.006
(.014) (.017)
Population Density .008 .034
(.131) (.166)
Trade Openness -.882
(.351)∗∗
Previous Transitions -.006
(.026)
Resource Curse .903
(.513)∗
Obs. 703 627 627
e(ll) -153.779 -131.85 -128.113
Note: All independent variables lagged one year. *=.10; **=.05; ***=.01.
the standard against which all other work in this ﬁeld should be measured.
We ﬁnd that PACL themselves erred in their own analysis, failing to correctly
estimate the standard errors of the coeﬃcients reported in their Markov models; and
that when doing so, the erred in a way that led them to report the impact of GDP on
democratization as insigniﬁcant. As did PACL, we too employed Markov methods; and
when we did so, we found reason to prefer a three-category classiﬁcation of democratic
regimes to the dichotomous categorization that they employed. Classifying countries into
autocracies, democracies, and partial democracies, we demonstrated that higher incomes
per capita signiﬁcantly increased the likelihood of democratic regimes, both by enhancing
the consolidation of existing democracies and by promoting transitions from authoritarian
to democratic systems.
Our trichotomous measure proved valuable for an additional reason: it highlighted
the signiﬁcance of the middle category — the partial democracies — a category whose
properties and signiﬁcance were necessarily obscured in the PACL analysis. These are
“fragile” democracies, or perhaps “unconsolidated democracies.” Whatever one wishes to
call them, they emerge from our analysis as critical to the understanding of democratic
transitions. More volatile than either straight autocracies or democracies, their movements
seem at the moment to be largely unpredictable. One of our major conclusions, then, is
that it is this category — the partial democracies — upon which future research should
focus.
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Figure 6: Adjusted and Unadjusted Hazard Rates for Transitions from Partial Democracy
to Autocracy
We also note that this is one area of scholarly inquiry with important implications
for policy. In the present era, countries are reforming both politically and economically.
Politically, they seek democracy. Economically, they pursue policies to promote economic
growth. Should these reforms be sequential or simultaneous; and if sequential, which—the
political or the economic—should come ﬁrst? PACL’s (2000) conclusion that economic
growth does not aid democratization, while democratic political institutions foster growth,
puts them squarely in the “politics ﬁrst” camp.
In arguing with PACL’s conclusions, though, we do not mean to imply that economic
reforms should take primacy over the political, as the problems of untangling the issues
of reciprocal causality in this ﬁeld are intense. Indeed, the current literature on policy
reform deals with exactly these causality issues by trying to ﬁnd a suitable instrument
for institutions, broadly deﬁned, that is not in turn aﬀected by the level of economic
development. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), for instance, use the widely-
known Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) measure of settler mortality as a proxy for
institutional quality. They ﬁnd that institutions are far more important as determinants of
economic growth than are either geography or trade. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2004) disagree with this conclusion, claiming that in fact better property rights
25under dictatorships help spur economic growth, which in turn facilitates the emergence of
democratic governance.
To this fruitful, ongoing debate we add a reminder that leaving autocracy is not the
same as entering democracy. Between these two lie partial democracies, which often act
in a manner distinct from those countries either more or less democratic than they, and
whose dynamics, while shaping contemporary politics, remain poorly understood.
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29Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics on Transitions
We have 169 countries in the dataset.22. Their patterns of stability and transitions are as
follows:
• 41 very stable countries: same Polity value throughout the dataset
– 23 very stable full democracies with Polity value of 1023
– 1 very stable democracy with Polity value of 824
– 4 very stable partial democracies existing between 8 and 11 years25
– 13 very stable autocracies26
• 42 stable countries: same category (autocracy, partial or democracy) throughout the
dataset but Polity value changes
– 4 stable democracies27
– 4 stable partial democracies28 (Note: none of these countries is more than 10
years old.)
– 34 stable autocracies29
After identifying the very stable and the stable countries, we want to characterize the
countries making transitions between categories. Two features seem to be of interest:
how many categories the country visited during our time period, and the direction of
the changes. Concerning the latter feature, we distinguish between somewhat stable
countries making a single transition during the time period studies and unstable countries
making several transitions.
22Twenty-ﬁve countries that existed during our sample period had no Polity scores: Andorra, Antigua &
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Cape Verde, Dominica, Grenada,
Liechtenstein, Maldive Islands, Malta, Monaco, Palau, San Marino, Sao Tome-Principe, Seychelles, Solomon
Islands, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Vanuatu, and Western
Samoa.
23Countries existing in all 41 years are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.
Countries existing less than all 41 years are: Czech Republic (8), Germany (11), West Germany (30),
Lithuania (10), Papua New Guinea (26), and Slovenia (10).
24Latvia (10)
25Estonia (10), Ethiopia after 1993 (8), Macedonia (10), Namibia (11)
26Countries existing in all 41 years are: Bhutan, Cuba, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Countries existing less
than all 46 years are: Eritrea (8), East Germany (29), Kyrgyzstan (10), Qatar (30), United Arab Emirates
(30), Uzbekistan (10), Vietnam (25), South Vietnam (16), and Yemen (11).
27 Israel, Jamaica, Mauritius, and Trinidad.
28 Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine
29Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo-Kinshasa, Egypt,
Gabon, East Germany, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Mauritania,
Morocco, Oman, Rwanda, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, USSR, North
Vietnam, North Yemen, South Yemen, and Former Yugoslavia.
30• 56 shifting between two categories
– 9 shifting between partial and democracy
∗ 4 somewhat stable: 3 countries up to democracy30 and 1 down to partial31
∗ 4 unstable countries going up once and down once32
– 37 shifting between partial and autocracy
∗ 22 somewhat stable: 15 up to partial33 and 7 down to autocracy34
∗ 17 unstable35
– 11 shifting between autocracy and democracy
∗ 9 somewhat stable: 7 countries up to democracy36 and 2 down to
autocracy37
∗ 2 unstable countries going two categories up once and two down once38
• 30 shifting between all three categories
– Only in one direction
∗ 6 countries up39 and none the other way
– 24 back and forth
∗ 12 countries making 3 transitions between categories40
∗ 4 making 4 transitions41
∗ 4 making 5 transitions42
∗ 2 making 6 transitions43
∗ 1 making 7 transitions44
30 Botswana, France, Slovakia, and South Africa
31 Malaysia
32 Columbia, France, India, and Sri Lanka
33 Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras,
Indonesia, Iran, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Paraguay, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia
34 Belarus, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Singapore, Somalia, Syria, and Zimbabwe
35 Up once and down once: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Pakistan (pre–1972),
and Zambia. More shifts: Albania, Cambodia, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Haiti, Nepal, Sierra
Leone, and Uganda
36 Bolivia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Portugal, Senegal, and Spain
37 Burma and Laos
38 Lesotho and Uruguay
39 Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, and Taiwan
40 Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Gambia, Greece, Madagascar, Niger, Panama, Philippines,
and Venezuela
41 Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Pakistan (post–1972), and Sudan
42 Argentina, Ecuador, Nigeria, and South Korea
43 Peru and Turkey
44 Thailand
31Appendix 2: Countries in Each Region
Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
East Asia: Australia, Burma, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea,
Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore,
Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
Europe: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia
Former Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
USSR(Soviet Union), Uzbekistan
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela
Near East: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
32